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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY
Character of the Accused-Cross Examination of Defendant's
Character Witnesses and Preliminary Inquiry by Trial Judge
State v. Johnson' is an extremely important decision relative to
character witnesses, and fulfills the promise of change heralded by
Justice Dennis' excellent dissenting opinion in State v. Bagley.2
Henceforth,3 says the majority in Johnson, new rules are to control
as to the cross-examination of defendant's character witnesses. No
longer can the prosecution ask a defendant's character witness
whether he "knows" of certain acts, convictions, arrests or rumors
concerning the defendant seemingly inconsistent with the favorable
testimony given by the character witness on the stand.' Instead,
"have you heard" questions may be put to the character witness. In
this respect, Johnson departs from prior jurisprudence. "The
legitimate function of the prosecution in subjecting the character
witness's testimony to the crucible of cross-examination ...... " says
the court, "can be performed without the suggestion or assertion of
facts in such a way as to arouse undue prejudice within the jury."'
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The writers express apprecia-
tion to Calvin P. Brasseaux and Paul E. Brown, for very able assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
** Member, St. Mary Parish Bar.
1. 389 So. 2d 372 (La. 1980) (opinion by Dennis, J.).
2. 378 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1979), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, Developments in
the Law. 1979-1980-Evidence, 41 LA. L. REV. 595 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
1979-1980 Developments].
3. Because the supreme court found that the defendant's objections had not been
urged properly in the trial court, it held that they could not be availed of on the appeal
in this case, and hence affirmed the conviction. The majority stated, however, that "in
future cases prejudicial error resulting from a trial court's failure to enforce the
safeguards adopted herein during the cross-examination of character witnesses will re-
quire reversal, if properly objected to an (sic) assigned." 389 So. 2d at 377. As to
waiver of objection to other crimes evidence discussed in Johnson, see the discussion
at note 96, infra and accompanying text.
4. See Pugh & McClelland. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 447 (1974) [hereinafter cited 1972-1973
Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 61-62 (Supp. 1978).
5. 389 So. 2d at 376-77.
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Further, the trial judge is to conduct a detailed preliminary in-
quiry outside the presence of the jury to safeguard the rights of the
defendant,' and to instruct the jury (either at the close of the testi-
mony or in the final charge) as to the "exact purpose" of the
character testimony.7
Character of the Accused-Absence of Reputation
Although recognizing that Louisiana jurisprudence had not been
consistent on the point,8 the court in what appeared to be a defi-
nitive opinion in State v. Frentz' stated in footnote:
The better view expressed by all textwriters is that the reputation-
witness should not only be permitted to testify that he had never
heard the accused's reputation discussed, but also his own opinion
that therefore, in his opinion, the accused's community reputa-
tion was good."
Despite the pronouncements in Frentz, the court this past year in
6. In this connection the court adopted the rules as formulated by the Superior
Court of New Jersey in State v. Steensen, 35 N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203, 206 (1955):
In determining whether to allow the cross-examination, the trial court should con-
duct a preliminary inquiry out of the presence of the jury and he should satisfy
himself:
(1) that there is no question as to the fact of the subject matter of the
rumor, that is, of the previous arrest, conviction, or other pertinent misconduct of
the defendant;
(2) that a reasonable likelihood exists that the previous arrest, conviction or
other pertinent misconduct would have been bruited about the neighborhood or
community prior to the alleged commission of the offense on trial;
(3) that neither the event or conduct nor the rumor concerning it occurred at
a time too remote from the present offense;
(4) that the earlier event or misconduct and the rumor concerned the specific
trait involved in the offense for which the accused is on trial; and
(5) that the examination will be conducted in the proper form, that is: "Have
you heard," etc., not "Do you know," etc.
Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
7. In Johnson the court expressed continued adherence to the position that for a
character witness to express his personal opinion as to the character of the defendant
is not permissible. This does not, however, preclude the character witness from ex-
pressing an opinion as to the quality of the reputation. See Pugh, The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 Term-Evidence, 17 LA. L. REv. 421
(1957), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 24 (1974).
8. See Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1977-1978 Term-Evidence, 39 LA. L. REV. 955, 971 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
1977-1978 Term].
9. 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978), discussed in 1977-1978 Term, supra note 8, at
971-72.
10. 354 So. 2d at 1011 n.2. Although citing some contrary holdings, the court did.
not refer to the cases relied upon in the later decision of State v. Toomer, 395 So. 2d
1320 (La. 1981), discussed at note 11, infra, and accompanying text.
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State v. Toomer," relying on cases decided prior to Frentz and in-
consistent with the above-quoted language, stated:
In the instant case, the character witnesses testified that they
had never heard any discussion of the reputation of the defendant
as to moral qualities having pertinence to the crime of murder.
There was then no other permissible question that could have been
asked of them."2
In the opinion of the writers, the Frentz position represents the
sounder view and it is hoped that in the future the court will
reinstate clearly the doctrine of Frentz.
Character of Alleged Rape Victim
If construed literally, Louisiana's rape shield statute'3 would
preclude any inquiry relative to prior sexual conduct of a rape victim
with any person other than the accused. In certain contexts, such an
interpretation would cause grave constitutional problems." Very ap-
propriately, the court in State v. Langendorfer'5 did not apply the
statute literally.
In Langendorfer defendant's defense was based in part on the
contention that sperm found in the victim was that of the victim's
husband. To meet the contention, the prosecution in its case in chief,
over objection of defendant, was permitted to ask the alleged victim
when she had last had sexual intercourse with her husband before
the rape. In a deft opinion authored by Justice Watson, a unanimous
court, relying upon the purpose of the statute, held that the legislation
did not prohibit the inquiry in question. To determine the scope to
be given to the statute, the court quite properly looked to its under-
lying purpose. ' The statute, said the court, "is intended to prevent
rape victims from being attacked and impeached on the irrelevant
issue of general unchastity" and "[o]nly evidence of prior sexual con-
duct which impeaches a victim's general 'reputation for chastity' is
excluded by the statute."'7 Since no effort was being made to attack
the character of the witness, and her answer would in no sense tar-
11. 395 So. 2d 1320 (La. 1981).
12. Id at 1327.
13. LA. R.S. 15:498 (Supp. 1975), discussed in Note, Louisiana's Protection for
Rape Victims: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 40 LA. L. REV. 268, 271-72 (1979): G. PUGH.
supra note 4, at 73 (Supp. 1978).
14. See Note, supra note 13, at 279.
15. 389 So. 2d 1271 (La. 1980).
16. See J. CUETO-Ruo, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW. 153 et. seq.
(1981); Tate, The Law-Making Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REV. 211, 227 (1968).
17. 389 So. 2d at 1274.
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nish her character, the question was not barred by the statute. The
writers fully agree.
Availability of Insurance
In Suhor v. Gusse"8 the Louisiana Supreme Court elucidated the
ramifications of a defendant's invoking Louisiana's merciful "inability
to pay" rule.' By invoking the. rule, the defendant puts at issue his
ability to respond in damages. The amount of defendant's liability in-
surance and the extent of other assets that might be available to
satisfy a judgment then becomes admissible, says the court in Suhor. °
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE
"Signature" Crimes
The court in State v. James"' reaffirmed its position as to
"signature" crimes. The mere fact that a defendant has committed
another crime substantially similar to the one charged does not
mean that it automatically qualifies for admissibility as a "signature"
crime. To qualify, the crime must be "so distinctively similar in
system that one must logically say that both crimes are the work of
the same person.""2 Further, said the court, the other crime must be
relevant to an issue presented in the case, as, for example, identity,
and this issue must be " 'real and genuine,'" not simply a fact put
at issue by defendant's plea of not guilty.23 In addition, the balancing
test is to be applied and the probative value of the evidence of the
other crime must be found to outweigh the risk of prejudice. Absent
some special relevance, another sale of heroin between the same
18. 388 So. 2d 755 (La. 1980).
19. The rule is discussed in detail in Guy v. Tonglet, 379 So.' 2d 744 (La. 1980),
which states:
Under the Louisiana law, a defendant can assert evidence of his impecunious con-
dition at the time of trial. The "inability to pay" rule dates back to Loyacano v.
Jurgens. 50 La. Ann. 441, 23 So. 717 (1898) and has been applied consistently by
Louisiana courts ever since.... The theory behind the rule was stated in Cole v.
Sherrill, 7 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942): "It has never been considered good
policy to bankrupt one to pay another even though the award granted is not in
line with other cases involving the same injuries and might not fully compensate
the plaintiff for the injuries he received. Fair justice between both parties must
be arrived at." 7 So. 2d at 211.
388 So. 2d at 746.
20. 388 So. 2d at 757.
21. 396 So. 2d 1281 (La. 1981).
22. Id. at 1287.
23. d at 1287 (quoting and relying upon State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781, 785 (La.
1973)).
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parties under similar circumstances on a different day does not meet
the test, held the court. The writers fully agree.
As pointed out in State v. Davis," the circumstance that the
crime charged does not require a specific intent does not preclude
admissibility of other crimes evidence. If the two crimes are "signa-
ture" crimes, evidence of the other crime may be admissible to prove
identity, provided, of course, that identity is a real and genuine
issue. 5
Failure to Give The Prieur Notice
In two cases decided during the past term, State v. Walker"6 and
State v. Vernon,' a majority of the court found that although the
prosecution had violated the Prieur notice requirement, the failure
was, under the circumstances, non-reversible error. Whether a pro-
secutorial error is reversible error is, of course, a very difficult pro-
blem." It appears to these writers that failure to give a required
Prieur notice is a violation of a substantial right of the accused
within the meaning of Code of Criminal Procedure article 921.29
Eight years have elapsed since the Prieur notice requirement was
announced by the court, and the rule is presumably very well-known
to all prosecutors. A requirement that it be fully complied with3"
does not appear unreasonable.
Other Crimes Evidence Offered by the Defendant
In State v. Washington"' the court held that, under certain cir-
cumstances, to deny a defendant the opportunity to introduce evid-
24. 389 So. 2d 71.
25. See State v. James. 389 So. 2d 71 (La. 1980). discussed in text at note 21,
supra.
26. 394 So. 2d 1181 (La. 1981).
27. 385 So. 2d 200 (La. 1980).
28. See State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 424 (La. 1980); State v. Boutte, 384 So. 2d 773
(La. 1980); State v. Herman, 304 So. 2d 322 (La. 1974); State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577
(La. 1974), discussed in Pugh, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 679 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1974.1975 Term]; 1979.1980 Developments, supra note 2, at 623-24; Comment,
Harmless Constitutional Error-A Louisiana Dilemma?, 33 LA. L. REv. 82 (1972),
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 550-54 (1974).
29. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921 provides: "A judgment or ruling shall not be
reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights of the accused."
30. See in this connection State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974), discussed in
1974-1975 Term, supra note 26, at 679, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4. at 568
(Supp. 1978).
31. 386 So. 2d 1368 (La. 1980)..
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ence to show another's other crimes is fundamentally unfair. In
Washington the prosecution contended that defendant was the per-
petrator of a series of allegedly very similar sexual attacks upon
young children. If the prosecution were to be permitted to show
such a series of crimes, the defendant, said the court, had the right
to try to show that the attacks continued after the defendant was
taken into custody.2
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Right to Recall Witness Under Cross-Examination
In State v. Shannon,33 following the completion of his examina-
tion of a prosecution witness, defense counsel obtained additional
information causing him to question the correctness of the witness's
testimony on a vital point. He sought to recall the witness under
cross-examination, but the trial court refused his request. Although
reversing on other grounds, a unanimous court speaking through
Justice Calogero, took pains to add that under the circumstances
this ruling, too, was erroneous. In a very significant footnote, the
court stated:
The defendant's constitutional right to produce evidence in
defense and to confront (cross-examine) the witnesses against
him far outweighs the trial judge's discretion in maintaining an
orderly presentation of the evidence. While we are mindful that
the decision of whether a witness may be recalled for further
cross-examination is left to the discretion of the trial judge, his
ruling may be reversed where an abuse of discretion is shown."
The writers fully agree.
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Prior Convictions -What Constitutes a "Crime"
One of the traditional methods of impeaching an opponent's
witness is to bring out that the witness was previously convicted of
a crime. 5 Is violation of a municipal ordinance to be deemed a
32. Id. at 1373. See also Justice Lemmon's interesting dissent in State v. Steven-
son, 390 So. 2d 1292, 1296 (La. 1980), as to the admissibility, on a motion to suppress a
confession, of other alleged acts of brutality by police when the officers have denied
ever so abusing anyone.
33. 388 So. 2d 731 (La. 1980).
34. Id. at 735 n.6.
35. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (Cleary ed. 1972).
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"crime?" The matter was before the court in State v. Ramos.30
The court noted in Ramos that although Louisiana Revised
Statutes 15:495, which provides the statutory authority for this
method of impeachment in Louisiana criminal cases, does not define
"crime," a definition of "crime" is given in article 7 of the Criminal
Code.37 The official comment to that article makes clear that the
redactors of the Code intended to exclude violation of municipal or-
dinances from the definition of "crime" for purposes of the Criminal
Code. In light of this exclusion, the court concluded that 15:495 does
not authorize attacking a witness's credibility by showing that the
witness was convicted of violating a municipal ordinance.
Prior Convictions -Details of the Crime
In the 1975 decision of State v. Jackson," a divided supreme
court held that a witness on cross-examination who admits that he
had previously been convicted of a crime properly may be questioned
about the details thereof in order to show "the true nature of the of-
fense." The recent case of State v. Oliver89 indicates somewhat of a
retreat from this unorthodox minority doctrine."0 Although dis-
tinguishing Jackson as inapplicable under the facts presented, a
unanimous court, in an opinion authored by Justice Watson noted
that Jackson had been much criticized and that "[t]he trial court has
the duty of restricting an inqdiry into details of a conviction within
reasonable bounds."'1 Further, the court stated: "Jackson must be
narrowly, rather than broadly, construed and care must be taken to
avoid prejudice to the rights of the accused by expansive reference
to details of a former conviction."' 2 It is to be hoped that in time the
Jackson doctrine will be abandoned completely.
36. 390 So. 2d 1262 (La. 1980).
37. Article 7 provides that:
a crime is that conduct which is defined as criminal in this Code, or in other acts
of the legislature, or in the constitution of this state.
CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:7 (1950).
38. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975), discussed in 1974-1975 Term, supra note 28, at 662,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4. at 171 (Supp. 1978); Pugh & McClelland, The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976.1977 Term-Evidence, 38 LA. L. REV.
567, 578 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1976-1977 Term].
39. 387 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (La. 1980).
40. For analysis and criticism of the Jackson line of cases see 1979-1980 Term,
supra note 2, at 605; 1976-1977 Term, supra note 38, at 578; 1974-1975 Term, supra
note 28, at 662, 663-64 reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 4, at 171 (Supp. 1978); Note,
Delving into the Details of Prior Convictions: The New Louisiana Rule, 38 LA. L.
REV. 899 (1978).
41. 387 So. 2d at 1155.
42. Id. at 1156.
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Adjudication of Juvenile Delinquency
A divided court on rehearing in State v. Toledano" indicated
that under certain circumstances, the juvenile record of a pro-
secutorial witness may have such discrediting value that defendant
has a constitutional right to see and expose it." The constitutional
right of bringing such fact to the attention of the jury is, of course,
a separate question from whether an adjudication of juvenile delin-
quency is a "crime" within the meaning of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 15:495."6 The court held that under the facts presented,
defendant, having requested access to the records, was entitled to
have the trial court determine whether the discrediting value of
prior adjudication was so strong that disclosure of the records was
essential to a fair trial.
Access to Rap Sheet of Prosecution Witness
The memorandum decision in State v. Juan" and the majority
decision on rehearing in State v. Toledano,7 apparently indicate that
a majority of the court is of the view that a defendant in a criminal
case is entitled to access to a prosecution witness's rap sheet in ad-
vance of trial. 8 The writers have difficulty, however, in reconciling
the position taken by the majority in State v. Williams" which
would limit such access to the rap sheets of prosecution witnesses
who themselves were implicated in the crime.
43. 391 So. 2d 817 (La. 1980).
44. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term -Evidence, 37 LA. L.
REV. 575, 586 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1975-1976 Term ], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra
note 4, at 165 (Supp. 1978); Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 538 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1973-1974 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 168 (Supp. 1978).
45. See discussion in notes 35-37, supra, and accompanying text. See State v.
Roberts, 331 So. 2d 11 (La. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); 1975-1976
Term, supra note 44, at 591 reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 4, at 173 (Supp. 1978); LA.
R.S. 13:1580.
46. 396 So. 2d 907 (La. 1981). "Defendant is entitled to conviction records of
state's witnesses. State v. Harvey, 358 So. 2d 1224." Id. at 907.
47. 391 So. 2d 817 (La. 1980).
48. See the foundation case of State v. Harvey, 358 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1978), discussed
in 1979-1980 Developments, supra note 2, at 606; Note, The Prosecutor's Dilemma-A
Duty to Disclose or a Duty Not to Commit Reversible Error, 40 LA. L. REV. 513
(1980).
49. 389 So. 2d 60 (La. 1980).
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PRIVILEGE
Physician-Patient
In a hard fought custody case may one parent, over a claimer of
privilege, gain access to the psychiatric records of the other? Prior
to adoption of legislation recognizing a physician-patient privilege
for Louisiana civil cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in the
affirmative." In light of the recent statutory provisions relative to
health care providers,' the First Circuit Court of Appeal in Wing v.
Wing"2 held such material subject to a valid claimer of privilege.
Jurors as Witnesses-Ambit of Permissible Testimony
La. R.S. 15:470 seemingly establishes a one-way street relative
to juror testimonial disqualification, ie., making a juror incompetent
"to testify as to his own or his fellows' misconduct," but competent
"to rebut any attack upon the regularity of the conduct." Such inter-
pretation creates serious constitutional problems.53 The first time
State v. Wisham reached the supreme court, 4 the court held that
despite the provisions of 15:470 jurors could properly testify to
"unauthorized communications or prejudicial conduct tantamount to
unauthorized communications"55 of third parties (the arrest of one of
the defense witnesses shortly after he testified, in the presence of
some of the jurors). On remand of the case, the trial court, over
defense objection, permitted the jurors also to testify that the con-
duct had had no effect upon their deliberations. Arguably, such
testimony was permissible as testimony to rebut "an attack upon
the regularity" of the jury proceedings. In Wisham II,5 a majority
of the supreme court held that such testimony was impermissible. In
the opinion of the writers, 15:470 needs reformulation.57
50. See Moosa v. Abdallah, 248 La. 344, 178 So. 2d 273 (1965), discussed in Pugh,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965.1966 Term-Evidence, 26
LA. L. REv. 606, 614 (1966): Note, Physician-Patient Privilege, 27 LA. L. REv. 361
(1967).
51. See LA. R.S. 13:3734 (Supp. 1972 & 1978). See also LA. R.S. 37:2366 (recogniz-
ing a psychologist-patient privilege).
52. 393 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
53. See a previous discussion of these problems in 1979-1980 Developments, supra
note 2, at 612.
54. 371 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1979).
55. Id. at 1154.
56. 384 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980).
57. For a further discussion of the matter, see 1979-1980 Developments, supra
note 2, at 612.
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Juror Testimony Impeaching Verdict
Does the statutory prohibition against testimony of a juror im-
peaching his verdict" prohibit jurors' testimony that during their
deliberations jury members consulted an obsolete law book found in
the jury room giving a pertinent, but erroneous, statement of law?
The question was presented to the court in State v. Sinegal. 9 The
court noted that "[ain exception to this [prohibition] exists when
there is an unauthorized communication or overt act by a third per-
son which creates an extraneous influence on the jury,"1' and that
the Fifth Circuit had held in Durr v. Cook 1 that "when the statutory
prohibition infringes on a defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial, jurors are competent to testify about juror misconduct." 'ez Con-
cluding that "[t]he written word of a legal volume is more of an in-
trusion than a verbal communication because of its imprimatur of
authority,"" the court held that testimony by the jurors as to their
action was not barred by the rule. The writers fully agree.
HEARSAY
Hearsay vs. Non-Hearsay- Complaint to Authorities
To what extent may a law enforcement or security officer
testify to information he received from third persons which caused
him to act in a particular way? The matter has given"4 and continues
to give difficulty. It is submitted that whether such testimony is
subject to a valid hearsay objection depends upon the issue to be
proved at the hearing. 5 Two cases decided during the past term
deal with the problem.
58. See LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950); discussed in 1979-1980 Developments, supra note 2,
at 612-13.
59. 393 So. 2d 684 (La. 1981).
60. Id. at 686.
61. 589 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'g State v. Durr, 343 So. 2d 1004 (La. 1977),
discussed in 1979-1980 Developments supra note 2, at 612-13.
62. As to the incompetency of a juror to testify to juror misconduct of less
egregious character (pre-charge discussion of the case among themselves), see State v.
Poree, 386 So. 2d 1331, 1339-40 (La. 1980).
63. 393 So. 2d at 686.
64. See 1977-1978 Term, supra note 8, at 980; 1975-1976 Term, supra note 44 at
606, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 530 (Supp. 1978).
65. See Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal
Cases, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 412 (1974);
Comment, Hearsay Evidence and Federal Rules: Article VIII-!. Mapping Out the
Borders of Hearsay, 36 LA. L. REv. 139 (1975), reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at
491 (Supp. 1978).
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State v. Bazile6 concerned the admissibility of testimony by a
police officer, at a hearing on a motion to suppress, as to information
he had received from others that led to his making a contested arrest.
Via a very lucid opinion authored by Justice Calogero, the court
held that such testimony is not subject to a valid hearsay objection.
The question at the suppression hearing directly concerned the
state of mind of the officer, i.e., whether the officer had probable
cause to believe defendant had committed the crime for which he
was arrested, not whether what the officer may have had reason to
believe was in fact true."1 Hence, as the writers see it, the court was
clearly correct in holding the testimony admissible, non-hearsay
evidence.
To be contrasted with State v. Bazile is State v. Turner." The
defendant in Turner was charged with taking contraband (Valium
pills) into the state penitentiary. The pills apparently had been
found on defendant's person during a visit to her two inmate sons
after a criminal investigator had ordered that all persons visiting
the sons be "thoroughly searched." The supreme court ruled that
the criminal investigator, over a hearsay objection, could properly
testify that he had ordered the search because he had received re-
ports that the inmate sons had "possibly" been "receiving contra-
band of some type of drugs." 9 The court held that such testimony
was not hearsay but was admissible as a fact "to show his reason for
ordering a search of all of the Turner brothers' visitors.""0
With deference it is submitted that the testimony in Turner
should have been held inadmissible hearsay because the issue at the
trial was not why the search was ordered, but whether the defen-
dant had committed the crime charged. On the other hand, if the
same testimony had- been offered at a motion to suppress hearing,
the testimony, as in State v. Bazile, should have there been held ad-
missible non-hearsay, for at such hearing the issue would have been
why the criminal investigator did what he did. 1
Statements by the Victim
State v. Doze"2 is an interesting sequel to State v. Raymond,"
66. 386 So. 2d 349 (La. 1980).
67. See authorities cited in notes 64 & 65 supra.
68. 392 So. 2d 436, (La. 1980).
69. Id. at 440.
70. Id.
71. See authorities cited in notes 64 & 65, supra.
72. 384 So. 2d 351 (La. 1980).
73. 258 La. 1, 245 So. 2d 335 (1971), discussed in Pugh, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term -Evidence, 32 LA. L. REv. 344, 352-55 (1972),
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 425, 426-27 (1974).
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State v. Weedon,74 and State v. Johnson5 relative to the admissibility
of testimony tending to show the state of mind of the victim of a
homicide. In an effort to show defendant's motive for killing his
landlady, the prosecution, over objection, was permitted to adduce
testimony as to a conversation the witness had had with the victim
the day of the homicide, during the course of which the deceased
had indicated an intent to evict the defendant. In an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Dixon, the court stated that "declarations
of mental state are generally admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, if introduced to prove the state of mind of the
declarant, when that state of mind is at issue."7 The state of mind
of declarant's landlady, however, was not at issue, noted the court,
and there was no evidence that the deceased landlady's intent to
evict the defendant had been communicated to the defendant. The
court held that in the absence of such a link, the evidence was inad-
missible. Because of the peculiar circumstances presented in the
case," the majority concluded that the admission of the statement
was harmless error.
Admission -Opinion Statement Made by Agent Without Personal
Knowledge
The general American view is that relevant non-privileged
statements made by a party litigant or his agent, when offered by
his opponent, are admissible as an admission even though the de-
clarant may have had no personal knowledge of the circumstances
adverted to, and his statement was in the form of an opinion."6 Here,
the reasons underlying the hearsay rule and the opinion rule are
said to be inapplicable." In American Employer's Insurance Co. v.
Honeycutt Furniture Co.8" the third circuit appears to have departed
from this view. In a suit against the City of Sulphur for negligent
acts allegedly committed by the Captain of the Fire Deiartment, the
74. 342 So. 2d 642 (La. 1977), discussed in 1976-1977 Term, supra note 38, at
584-85.
75. 381 So. 2d 436 (La. 1980), discussed in 1979.1980 Term, supra note 2, at 614-15.
76. 384 So. 2d at 353.
77. As a majority of the court saw it, the inadmissible out-of-court statement was
consistent with the defendant's defense (that the landlady had attacked the defendant
with a kitchen knife); the court reasoned that the contents of the out-of-court state-
ment showed a basis for the landlady to be angry or upset with the defendant. Id. at
354. In dissent, Justice Dennis argued that the inadmissible oiut-of-court statement
brought prejudicial information to the attention of the jury. Id. at 355 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
78. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 263 at 632 (Cleary ed. 1972).
79. Id
80. 390 So. 2d 255, 259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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plaintiff relied heavily on a letter written by the Mayor and con-
sidered at a Civil Service proceeding against the city employee in
question. In this letter, the Mayor had made "a statement to the ef-
fect that" the subject employee had been negligent at the time of
the incident.
. In the opinion of the writers, the court of appeal clearly was cor-
rect in rejecting plaintiff's contention that the letter constituted a
judicial confession binding the city.' On the other hand, with
deference, it is submitted that the court erred in concluding that the
letter was "hearsay and cannot be considered,"" that the letter had
"no evidentiary value,"83 and that it "was nothing more than an opi-
nion based on facts admittedly not within his own knowledge.""
Since the statement was relevant and non-privileged, and was made
by defendant's agent acting within the scope of his authority, it is
believed the statement should have been admissible against the
defendant as an admission,85 and that the Mayor's lack of personal
knowledge of the facts and conclusory pronouncements should have
gone to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.8
Erroneous Admission of Hearsay Evidence Not Cured or Waived by
Opponent's Later Calling Declarant as Witness
State v. Boudreaux,"1 authored by Justice ad hoc Schott,88 af-
fords an excellent discussion of an important hearsay question.
Where a hearsay statement has been admitted improperly, is the er-
ror cured or waived by the declarant's later being called as a
witness by the opponent? To show defendant's alleged complicity in
a bicycle theft, the prosecution called a police officer who, over
defense objection, was permitted to read a statement made by an
alleged co-conspirator given after the latter's arrest during the
course of which the purported co-conspirator stated that the defen-
dant had assisted him in the crime. This statement was clearly inad-
missible hearsay, said the court. It was not admissible as a confes-
81. Id. at 260. See Pugh, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1966-1967 Term-Evidence, 28 LA. L. REV. 429, 438-39 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
1966-1967 Term], reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 438 (1974).
82. 390 So. 2d at 259.
83. Id at 260.
84. Id.
85. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 78, at § 267. at 640-41; FED. R. EvID. 801(d)2).
86. See 4 J. WIGMOR,, EVIDENCE § 1053, at 18. (Chabourn rev. 1972) ("A person's
assertions regarding his own affairs have always some testimonial value regardless of
the exactness of his personal observation of the data leading to his belief.").
87. 396 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1981).




sion; the declarant had not been joined as a co-defendant. It was not
admissible as a statement by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a
crime; it was made after the termination of the alleged conspiracy.
To counter the statement, defendant himself called declarant as
a witness. Although admitting havingmade the statement, the de-
clarant said he had "messed up" as to that portion implicating the
defendant. The prosecution, relying on the post-Bruton line of cases
relative to defendant's right of confrontation, 9 contended that any
error in the admission of the statement was rendered harmless
when defendant called declarant to the stand and "thereby gained
an opportunity to confront and examine"9 him. The post-Bruton line
of cases was inapplicable, said the court, for the issue was not
whether defendant's constitutional rights had been violated; instead,
the issue was the impropriety of admitting the inadmissible hearsay
evidence. Further, the court said that the admission of the hearsay
statement violated a substantial right of the defendant-his right
not to have prejudicial hearsay evidence admitted against him.'
In the opinion of the writers, the court in Boudreaux clearly was
correct.2 Even if the state on cross-examination of the alleged co-
conspirator had then sought to introduce the witness's prior state-
ment, it could have done so only as impeaching evidence,93 not as
substantive evidence.'
PRESERVING RIGHTS FOR APPEAL
Necessity for Contemporaneous Objection
Generally a defense counsel "waives" or loses his client's right
to object to a trial court or prosecutorial action unless he interposes
an objection. Further, the general rule is that announced last term
in State v. Baylis9 -when a defendant's objection has been sustain-
89. See Nelson v. O'Neal, 402 U.S. 622 (1971), discussed in 1977-1978 Term, supra
note 8, at 984-87.
90. 396 So. 2d at 1304.
91. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921 provides: "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed
by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does
not affect substantial rights of the accused." See also 1979-1980 Developments, supra
note 2, at 622-24.
92. In this regard, see the discussion of State v. Johnson, 381 So. 2d 436 (La.
1980), in 1979-1980 Developments, supra note 2, at 613.
93. LA. R.S. 15:497 (1950).
94. See State v. Hathorn, 395 So.2d 783 (La. 1981) State v. Williams. 258 La. 251,
246 So. 2d 4 (1971); 1979-1980 Developments, supra note 2, at 162.
95. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841, discussed in 1975.1976 Term, supra note 44, at
.611, reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 578 (Supp. 1978).
96. 388 So. 2d 713 (La. 1980).
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ed, if he wishes an admonition to disregard or a mistrial he must ask
for it or he is entitled to no relief on appeal. In State v.
Williamson,"7 because of the gravity of the error involved (an er-
roneous jury instruction as to the definition of the crime), the court
granted relief on appeal despite defendant's failure to interpose an
objection.
This past term in State v. Johnson," defense counsel, for the
first time on a motion for new trial, had raised the issue of what ap-
pears to have been clearly improper crossexamination. of the defen-
dant by the prosecution as to defendant's prior arrests. The
supreme court in Johnson held that because of defense counsel's
failure to interpose a timely objection at trial, the right to raise the
objection had been waived. In light of Williamson and the recent
Fifth Circuit habeas corpus case of Nero v. Blackburn," arguably the
prosecutorial cross-examination of defendant was so improper'" that
defendant should be able to raise the error on a motion for new trial
or in a habeas corpus proceeding."'
Necessity for Contemporaneous Objection -Implied Objection
State v. Marcal'" holds that to preserve his rights, defense
counsel must object to a trial court's ruling sustaining a prosecu-
torial objection. Although not an unreasonable interpretation of the
literal provisons of article 841/of the Code of Criminal Procedure as
amended in 1974,103 it seems to these writers an unnecessarily
technical one. If a defense counsel puts a question to a witness and
because of the trial court's sustaining the prosecution's objection he
97. 389 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1980).
98. 389 So. 2d 372 (La. 1980), discussed in note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
99. 597 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1979), discussed in Pugh & McClelland. The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Evidence, 40 LA. L. REV. 779,
780-81 (1980). In Nero the federal court granted a Louisiana defendant relief because
his counsel had failed to request a mistrial after his objection to inadmissible other
crimes evidence had been sustained. The court reasoned that under the circumstances
the defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel.
100. See LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950); LA. CODE CriM. P. art. 770.
101. See e.g., FED. R. EviD. 103(d); 1976-1977 Term, supra note 38, at 593-94. See
also State v. Smith, 388 So. 2d 801 (La. 1980).
102. 388 So. 2d 656 (La. 1980).
103. Article 841 provides in part:
An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was ob-
jected to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to rulings or orders is un-
necessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court
is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the
court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds
therefor. ...
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841, discussed in 1975-1976 Term, supra note 44, at 611,
reprinted in G. PUGH, supra note 4, at 578 (Supp. 1978).
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is precluded from eliciting the desired information, it is submitted
that an objection to the court's ruling could properly, and should, be
inferred from the circumstances."'
Although the court in Marcal did not mention its earlier decision
in State v. Boutte,00 it seems to these writers that Boutte reflects a
very different, and we believe, a more desirable interpretation of
Code of Criminal Procedure article 841. In Boutte, with respect to
the prosecution's claim that defendant had forfeited his right by fail-
ing formally to object to the trial court's decision sustaining the pro-
secution's objection to any testimony being given by a defense
witness (on the ground that the witness had violated the court's se-
questration order), the court said:
The contemporaneous objection rule, now stated in C. Cr. P. art.
841, did away with the requirement that a party file formal bills
of exceptions and states: "It is sufficient that a party ... makes
known to the court the action which he desires the court to take.
... " The trial judge here was fully cognizant that defendant was
asking that [the witness] be allowed to testify. 6
Under the circumstances, defense counsel's failure to state "I
object" was deemed to be of no significance. The writers fully agree
with the position taken in Boutte and hope it will be followed in the
future.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Proof of Prior Conviction
On writs to the supreme court in State v. Valentine,17 defendant
complained that he had been convicted improperly of driving while
intoxicated, second offense. He contended that there was insufficient
evidence at trial to establish the earlier conviction. Actually, at trial
the only "evidence" of the earlier conviction was a statement by the
trial judge, "Well I think that the first conviction took place in this
court.""' Applying an expansive view of judicial notice, a majority of
the court, over a very persuasive dissent by Justice Dennis, upheld
the conviction. The majority reasoned that the trial court could prop-
erly rely upon the preliminary examination proceedings, at which a
court minute entry had been introduced, without objection, showing
104. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 20 (1980); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 52
(Cleary ed. 1972).
105. 384 So. 2d 773 (La. 1980).
106. Id. at 777.
107. 397 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1981).
108. Id. at 1299-1300.
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an earlier conviction. The dissenting opinion notes, however, that
"[t]here is nothing to indicate that the trial judge referred to the
record of the preliminary hearing in making this remark" and "the
record of the preliminary hearing was never introduced into evi-
dence at the trial of this case."'" Since the trial was one before a
judge sitting without a jury, and the offense charged was relatively
minor, it is not surprising that the proceedings in question may have
been somewhat informal. The dissenting opinion, however, ex-
presses well-grounded fear that the doctrine adopted by the majority
is a
dangerous judicial notice rule which may permit many defen-
dants to be convicted and imprisoned on the basis of a faulty but
legally unassailable judicial memory. As such, the rule of this
case sweeps far beyond that of modern notions of judicial notice
and contains none of the procedural safeguards usually
afforded."'
109. Id at 1300 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1300-01 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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